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ABSTRACT 
A significant number of New Zealand companies are effectively controlled by one person 
who is usually the main shareholder and the executive director. If a tortious act is carried 
out by that person in a situation in which the company is the primary tortfeasor and the 
director is acting for the company, an "interesting and difficult" question arises as to the 
personal liability of the director. The doctrine of separate corporate personality 
establishes that the company is a distinct legal entity and as such it should be liable for its 
torts. It is also true that a director, like any other person, should be responsible for his or 
her own torts. However, a one person company director will be the "controlling mind" of 
the company to such an extent that it will be difficult to see why the director should 
escape liability from tortious conduct through the vehicle of a corporate entity. This paper 
seeks to determine in what circumstances the courts will find a director personally liable 
through an analysis of the various tests that have been identified by the courts. These tests 
will be considered in the light of the separate corporate personality doctrine. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page and footnotes) comprises approximately 12, 038 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
A significant number of New Zealand companies are effectively controlled by 
one person who is usually the main shareholder and the executive director. If a 
tortious act is carried out by that person in a situation in which the company is 
the primary tortfeasor and the director is acting for the company, an 
"interesting and difficult" 1 question arises as to the personal liability of the 
director. 
The doctrine of separate corporate personality establishes that the company is 
a distinct legal entity and as such it should be liable for its torts.2 It is also true 
that a director, like any other person, should be responsible for his or her own 
torts. 3 However, where the director exercises the degree of control common in 
a one person company it may be difficult to distinguish whether the tortious 
act should be attributed to the company or to the director. A number of tests 
have been formulated to deal with the issue but these often analyse 
responsibility according to the level and nature of the director's personal 
involvement. However, in the one-person company situation a director will 
almost always be fully involved in the company's actions and there is a 
danger of making such a director liable in almost every situation, despite the 
fact of incorporation. This paper seeks to analyse the tests developed by the 
judiciary to decide whether a director may be found liable for a company tort 
and assess their usefulness in the one person company context. 
II THE DIRECTOR'S TORT OR THE COMPANY'S TORT 
A director will escape liability for a tortious act if that act is imputed to the 
company either through the rules of attribution or because that director is 
identified with the company. In such a circumstance only the company may be 
liable. Alternatively, the director may be considered to have acted as the agent 
of the company and in acting as an agent may in some situations become 
1 Centrepac Partnership & Ors v Foreign Currency Consultants Ltd & Ors (1989) 3 NZCLC 
64,940, 64,950. 
2 [1897] AC 22. 
3 Yuille v B & B Fisheries (Leigh) Ltd [ 1958] 2 Lloyd's Rep 596, 619. 
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personally liable as a joint tortfeasor with the company.4 A tortious act will 
normally be considered that of the company unless there is clear evidence that 
the director was acting as the company's agent "in a way that renders him 
personally liable". 5 Prior to considering how the director can act in such a way 
as to become personally liable, the rules of attribution, identification and 
agency will be discussed in so far as they are relevant to the one person 
company director. 
A The rules of attribution 
A corporation is a statutory creation that can only act because the law 
attributes to it certain actions of its directors or officers. In Meridian Global 
Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission 6 Lord Hoffmann 
explained that the primary rules of attribution which show whether particular 
acts or knowledge belong to the company can be found in the Companies Act 
1993, in the company's constitution and may be implied by company law. 
However, if the answer is not found there the enquiry will be extended to the 
principles of agency and vicarious liability.7 
1 Agency 
A director may be described as an agent of the company but it is important 
to distinguish whether this agency is present in the legal sense, where a 
person is engaged to bring the principal into contractual relations with third 
parties, 8 or merely in the popular sense.9 If a "popular" agency is present 
the director will be doing no more than acting as the company's "hands" 
and thus only the company should be liable. If true agency is established it 
will be necessary to ascertain the limits of the authority conferred by the 
principal, or company, on the director. Personal liability should only arise 
4 JH Farrar, The Personal Liability of Directors for Corporate Torts, (1997) 9 Bond LR, I 02. 
5 Trevor ivory v Anderson [ 1992] 2 NZLR 517, 527. 
6 Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission [ I 995] 3 NZLR 7. 
7 n 6, 11. 
8 Butterworths Commercial Law in New Zealand (3'd ed) (Butterworths, Wellington, 1996) 
489. 
9 n 5, 526 per Hardie Boys J . 
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where the tortious act was outside the actual or ostensible authority of the 
director. 
The one person company director will almost always be an agent in the 
popular sense because of the heavy level of involvement in the business such 
a person tends to undertake. That director will most likely have the authority 
to bind the company contractually but it is unlikely that the given authority 
would include carrying out tortious acts . An exception may be where a 
company is incorporated specifically to act in a tortious manner, for 
example, to infringe another's copyright. There the tortious act can be seen 
as that of the company and on one analysis the true tortfeasor succeeds in 
hiding behind the "veil of incorporation" . However, in Yuille v B & B 
Fisheries (Leigh) Ltd '0 it was held that directors could not claim the 
protection of separate corporate personality where the company had been 
formed for the purpose of committing a wrongful act. Lord Salmon later 
agreed with this finding but added that each case would depend on its own 
facts .11 
Beck has criticised agency as inappropriate "to explain the economic unity 
which occurs in the one person company" and adds that a genuine rather than 
a contrived agency must be found. 12 Thus, it will be necessary to analyse the 
director ' s relationship with the company to ascertain the type of agency which 
exists. 
In Meridian Lord Hoffmann noted that principles such as agency may be of 
limited use where a rule requires a certain act or state of mind on the part of a 
particular person rather than that person ' s servants or agents. 13 His Lordship 
considered that in such cases the court should devise a special rule of 
attribution for the particular substantive rule. This would require asking how 
the act was intended to apply to a company and whose act was for that 
10 n 3. 
11 Wah Tat Bank v Chan Cheng Kum [ 1975] 2 All ER 257. 
12 A Beck, "The two sides of the corporate veil" in Contemporary Issues in Company Law, 
Professor Farrar (ed) (1987) 69, 75. 
13 n 6, 12. 
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particular purpose intended to count as the act of the company. 14 Such an 
enquiry would involve considerations of statutory interpretation and the 
content and policy of the rule. 
Thus, in Meridian knowledge of a security interest was attributed to the 
company as soon as it was known to an employee acting with authority 
because the purpose of the securities legislation was rapid disclosure and in 
that context there was no time to wait until the knowledge had been conveyed 
to senior management. Thus, where a state of mind is necessary for the 
particular rule, the enquiry may move from considerations of employment or 
agency to a purposive analysis of the relevant statute or rule. 
2 Vicarious liability 
A company will be vicariously liable for the torts of its employees. 15 This may 
lead to an enquiry as to whether the director is an "employee" who was acting 
in the course of his or her employment in carrying out the tortious act. 16 If the 
director was acting outside the bounds of his or her employment then the act 
may qualify as a personal one for which the director is liable. In Lees v Lee 's 
Air Farming Ltd 17 it was held that a director of a one person company could 
be described as an employee of that company even though this may seem 
' artificial'. 
A more difficult question may be whether the act was carried out in the course 
of the director ' s employment. This requires an application of tests such as that 
the director "not only order what is to be done, but how it shall be done" 18 or 
to ask whether the act carried out was an integral part of the business of the 
company. 19 In a closely held company it is likely that these tests would be 
made out so that in this the director will usually be held to be acting in the 
course of employment. 
14 n6, 12-1 3. 
15 Lloydv Grace, Smith & Co [1912] AC 716 . 
16 J Payne, The Attribution ofTortious Liability between Director and Company (1998) JBL 
160. 
17 [1961] NZLR 325 . 
18 Collins v Hertfordshire County Council [1947] KB 598, 615 . 
19 Lee Ting Sang v Chung Chi-Keung [1990] 2 AC 374 (PC). 
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A criticism of attribution is that it allows executive directors to avoid liability 
because of a legal fiction deeming that their acts are those of the company 
when other employees remain liable.20 However, in Americana 's Ltd v State 
Insurance Ltd 21 the arson of the company's chef was attributed to the 
company where the insurance policies stated that there would be no cover for 
damage "occasioned by the wilful act or with the connivance of the insured". 
The facts of the case showed that the chef was effectively a 25% shareholder 
who had masked his involvement to obtain a liquor licence for the company. 
Although the case involved an insurance claim within the context of a 
criminal act, it is instructive to note that the High Court was willing to look to 
the substance rather than the form of the incorporation to attribute the act to 
the chef/shareholder. The court looked to the true role of the chef within the 
company, whether that role provided a motive for arson , whether the chef 
could sensibly be regarded as acting/or the company (burning the premises 
was not for the company), the nature of the relationship between the arsonist 
and the others involved in the business and a consideration of the 
consequences of a decision either way. 
B Identification 
An alternative analysis is found in Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass 22 
which laid down the "living mind and will" doctrine. A key passage from 
Lord Reid follows: 
"A living person has a mind which can have knowledge or intention or be negligent 
and he has hands to carry out his intentions. A corporation has none of these: it must 
act through living persons, though not always one or the same person. Then the 
person who acts is not speaking or acting for the company. He is acting as the 
company and his mind which directs his acts is the mind of the company. There is no 
question of the company being vicariously liable ... He is an embodiment of the 
company ... It must be a question of law whether, once the facts have been 
20 D Wishart, The Personal Liability of Directors in Tort ( l 992) I O C & SLJ 363 , 365. 
2 1 (1999) 6 NZBLC 102,892. 
22 [1972] AC 153 . 
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ascertained , a person in doing particular things is to be regarded as the company or 
merely as the company's servant or agent. In that case any liability of the company 
can only be a statutory or vicarious liability ."23 
In Nordik Industries Ltd v Regional Controller of Inland Revenue Supreme 
Court 24 a director was identified as his company' s "self' so that a charge 
against the director for defrauding that company could not be made out 
because "a person cannot defraud himself '. Applying the Tesco decision 
Cooke J, as he then was, found that the person who speaks and acts as the 
company and who is in control of the company is not the company's alter ego 
but is instead identified with the company. Cooke J quoted Lord Reid in Tesco 
who said that it is possible for the board of directors or the memorandum and 
articles of association of a company to delegate the exercise of the powers of 
the company to certain people who are thereby identified as acting as the 
company. In this case this meant that the director's knowledge of the falsity of 
the returns could be attributed to the company. Given the mental element 
necessary in a charge of fraud , this would seem to fit with the extraordinary 
circumstances procedure of Lord Hoffmann in Meridian. 
A director of a nominee company was personified and identified with that 
company in Kendall Wilson Securities Ltd v Barraclough 25 . In Ivory Cooke P 
reconciled these cases with the finding of separate legal entity in Lee v Lee 's 
Air Farming Ltd 26 by saying that Kendall and Nordik involved the company's 
interactions with the outside world while Lee dealt with the relationship 
between the company and the shareholder. 27 Thus in Ivory, which involved a 
company' s alleged negligence against a client, the Tesco directing mind and 
will doctrine was considered useful in deciding the case. Cooke P added that: 
"If a person is identified with a company vis-a-vis third parties, it is reasonable that 
prima facie the company should be the only party liable." 
23 n 22, 170. 
24 [1976] I NZLR 194. 
25 [1986] I NZLR 576. 
26 n 17. 
27 n 5, 520. 
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It can be argued that the client is aware they are dealing with a company and 
sees the person as merely an extension of that company. 
Decisions such as Tesco where directors were described as "being" the 
company were based on interpretations of the relevant statutes, often in the 
context of imposing criminal or regulatory liability. The relevant "rule" was 
intended by the judiciary or the legislature to charge the company for the acts 
done by its agents or employees as if the company had committed the acts 
itself. 28 Thus, the doctrine is limited to certain contexts. Cooke J recognised 
this limitation in Nordik but added that Tesco provided important guidance on 
matters of general principle. Lord Hoffmann warned that to analogise a 
company fully with a natural person in this way was dangerous because: 
" this anthropomorphism, by the very power of the image, distracts attention from 
the very purposes for which ... the notion of directing mind and will [is used], 
namely to apply the attribution rule derived from the specific statutory rule in 
question ." 29 
Thus, anthropomorphism should be confined to its proper place in the 
relevant statutory context. An over-emphasis on the legal person metaphor 
can be misleading because it implies moral and physical presence when the 
company's personhood is no more than a legal fiction. 
The directing mind or "organic theory" has been criticised as a "grotesque 
anthropomorphism"30 by Wishart who argues that companies are often too 
large and diffuse to identify one particular area of decision making. In 
Livingstone v Bonifant 31 it was held that the protection of incorporation was 
more important in the case of a large company where errors could more easily 
escape the notice of the principal shareholder than in the case of a one person 
28 JW Neyers, Canadian Corporate Law, Veil-Piercing and the Private Law Model 
Corporation, 50 Univ of Toronto LJ 173, 229. 
29 n 6. 
30 D Wishart, Company Law in Context (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1994) 144. 
31 (1995) 7 NZCLC 260, 657. 
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company. 
III THEPRIMACYOFCOMPANYLAW 
A The pre-eminence of the separate corporate personality doctrine 
The primary hurdle to a finding of personal liability against a director lies 
in the doctrine of separate corporate personality. A company cannot 
commit a tortious act without the aid of human agency and it is argued that 
those "agents" are merely carrying out the company' s tort and should not 
be liable. The separate corporate entity doctrine was laid down in the 
leading English case of Salomon v Salomon32 which established that even a 
one person company is at law a different person from its subscribers .33 
Their Lordships held that the corporate entity could not be considered a 
trustee or agent for Mr Salomon. This principle is fundamental to company 
law and is commonly revered by judges and academics alike.34 This is 
largely because the principle and its limited liability cousin allows capital 
to be collected from a number of investors over time and avoids transfer 
costs when new members are admitted or the business is sold. 35 
B Piercing the corporate veil 
If a company tort has been carried out by a director and a plaintiff seeks to 
sue the director personally an objection may be that this will involve 
"piercing the corporate veil" . Despite the importance of the separate legal 
personality doctrine, the courts have arguably done this in a number of 
situations. 36 For example, where it can be shown that the company was a 
mere fac;ade a court may be willing to go behind the corporate entity to 
find the director liable.37 Further, a special agency relationship may be 
created which allows the court to attribute liability on agency principles, 
32 
[ 1897] AC 22 (HL). 
33 n 32 per Lord Macnaghten . 
34 R Grantham & C Rickett, "The Bookmaker's Legacy to Company Law Doctrine" in 
Corporate Personality in the 20th Centwy, R. Grantham & C. Rickett , eds. , (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 1998) I. 
35 D Goddard, " Corporate Personality - Limited Recourse and its Limits" in Corporate 
Personality in the 201" Century, R Grantham & C Rickett, eds, 18 . 
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although this is not considered to be true veil piercing.38 A court will 
consider whether this action will threaten the objectives of separate 
personality such as the limited liability of shareholders. 
A survey of New Zealand jurisprudence reveals that the courts have 
preferred to uphold the pre-eminence of the separate corporate personality 
doctrine in all but the most extreme situations. In Savi!! v Chase Holdings 
(Wellington) Ltd; Concept Investments Ltd v Savill 39 it was held that " ... it 
is appropriate to pierce the corporate veil only where special circumstances 
exist indicating that it is a mere fa<;ade concealing the true facts."40 The 
superiority of corporate form over substance has been further upheld in 
other cases including Cricklewood Holdings Ltd v CV Quigley & Sons 
Nominees Ltd 4 1 which stated that the corporate veil may possibly be lifted 
in the case of a bare trust. 
In Attorney-General v Equiticorp Industries Group Ltd (Jn Statutory 
Management) 42 where the chairman and chief executive had virtually decided 
which company within a group of companies should be used for a particular 
acquisition or transaction , it was argued that this meant that one company 
within the group of companies could be seen as the implied agent, trustee or 
partner of the other companies. Although this description of a group of 
companies as a single economic unit has been accepted in some 
circumstances,43 the Court of Appeal rejected the argument as inconsistent 
with the judgment of the House of Lords in Salomon and of the Privy Council 
in Lee v Lee 's Air Farming Ltd.44 They noted that in Salomon the House of 
Lords rejected the idea that agency could be used to impugn the non-liability 
36 A Beck, "The two sides of the corporate veil" in Contemporary Issues in Company l aw, 
Professor Farrar (ed) (1987) 69, 72. 
37 Woolfson v Strathclyde Regional Council 1978 SL T 159 HLSc. 
38 PL Davies, Gower' s Principles of Modern Company Law (61h ed) (Sweet & Maxwell , 
London, 1997) 173. 
39 [1989] I NZLR257. 
40 n 30, 279, citing the test from Wo olfson v Strathclyde Regional Council [ 1978] SC 90 (HL). 
41 [1992] I NZLR 463 ; Bare trust also considered a possible situation for piercing the 
corporate veil in Kendall Wilson Securities Ltd v Barraclough [1986] I NZLR 576. 
42 [1996] 1 NZLR528 . 
43 n38, 166. 
44 [1961]NZLR325 . 
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of members for the acts of the corporation. The Court of Appeal said it was 
possible to look behind the corporate fa<;ade and identify the real nature of a 
transaction and the reality of the relationship created. However, in this case 
the contracts were accepted as genuine and the Court saw no need to look 
behind them to ascertain the true position. 
The Commonwealth courts have recognised that a finding of tortious 
liability against a director may threaten the separate corporate personality 
doctrine and have consequently retreated from such findings in decisions 
such as that of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Trevor Ivory Ltd v 
Anderson,45 the House of Lords decision in Williams v Natural Life Health 
Foods Ltd 46 and in Justice La Forest's dissent in London Drugs Ltd v 
Kuehne & Nagel International Ltd.47 
Thus, the doctrine of separate corporate personality stands as a bar to director 
liability. The corporate veil may appear particularly artificial in the one person 
company context but it is in such a context that the leading cases have upheld 
the separate corporate entity. However, David Goddard argues that a person ' s 
civil liability for acting wrongfully in person, in breach of non-voluntary 
obligations imposed by the general law will not be reduced by the presence of 
a corporate entity.48 It can be argued that there is no such thing as a company 
which is a legal person, it is merely a 'corporate patrimony' or nexus of 
contracts. As such natural persons should be responsible for their torts.49 
C Limited liability 
One case where the court refused to find the director liable was Ivory in which 
Cooke P stated that the imposition of liability on the director of a one person 
company could erode the principle of limited liability. However, limited 
liability does not extend to directors but is intended to protect shareholders 
from responsibility beyond the value of their paid up share capital. Wishart 
45 n 5. 
46 Williams v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd [ 1998] 2 All ER 577. 
47 (1992) 97 DLR ( 41h) 261. 
48 n 35 , 36. 
49 Ireland, The Myth of Shareholder Ownership (1999) 62 MLR 41. 
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has described this as "fuzzy thinking"50 but it could be argued that the very 
existence of the corporate veil suggests that directors are unlikely to be found 
personally liable where they have organised a transaction for a company and 
are also the main shareholder. This is especially so in the case of a one person 
company where the key purpose of incorporation is to achieve limited liability 
protection. 51 In Ivory Cooke P observed that the absolute nature of the limited 
liability doctrine was necessary to encourage business activity and safeguard 
the effects of incorporation. 
IV TESTS FOR DIRECTOR LIABILITY 
A The direct or procure test 
This is the oldest test for director liability and holds that a director who has 
either expressly or impliedly directed or procured the commission of a tortious 
act may be personally liable. 52 The test does not adequately distinguish 
between the act of the company and that of the director53 and consequently it 
is of limited use in the one person company context. Recognising this 
limitation the English courts have sought to find something more than that the 
defendant held the position of director or exercised complete control over an 
organisation. In White Horse Distillers Ltd v Gregson Assoc. Ltd 54 the court 
said liability on the basis of directorship alone would be "irrational" because it 
would contradict the legal principles underlying the creation of a one person 
company. This limitation was recognised in Ivory where Cooke P agreed that 
the directs or procures test may "go near to imposing liability in every case". 55 
The English courts thus added a requirement of knowledge or constructive 
knowledge in an attempt to distinguish the director's personal acts from those 
of the company.56 This was, nevertheless, a lower standard than that adopted 
50 n 20, 363. 
5 1 M Stall worthy, Company Law: Liability of Directors (1997) ICCLR 8(5) 87. 
52 Performing Right Society Ltd v Ciryl Theatrical Syndicate Ltd [ 1924) I KB I . 
53 n 4, 2. 
54 [1984) RPC 61. 
55 n 5, 520. 
56 Also Performing Right SocietyLtd v Ci1yl Theatrical Syndicate Ltd [1924] l KB I and 
Rainham Chemical Works Ltd v Belvedere Fish Guano Co Ltd [1921] 2 AC 465. 
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by the Canadian courts. For example, in Mentmore Merchandising Co Ltd v 
National Merchandising Manufacturing Co lnc57 it was held that the director 
needed to actually "make the act or conduct his own as distinct from that of 
the company". 58 The Mentmore test of making the tort his or her own would 
seem preferable for director liability in the one person company context. Such 
a director will direct or procure all of the company activities and this test 
allows an analysis of whether the act is that of the director or the company. 
Mentmore was applied in White Horse Distillers Ltd v Gregson Associates 
Ltd 59 but doubted by the Court of Appeal in Evans (C) & Sons Ltd v 
Spritebrand Ltd 60 where it was held that a director could be personally liable 
where he or she had directed or procured the tort and a knowing, deliberate 
participation in the alleged tort was held not to be an essential pre-condition 
to personal liability. Dismissing the director' s appeal, the court stated that as 
mens rea was not a requirement in this action for copyright infringement, the 
plaintiffs did not have to prove a particular state of mind in the defendant. 
It is instructive to note that many of the cases where the directs or procures 
test was used often turned on particular statutory wording. 61 For example, in 
the Performing Right Society v Ciryl Theatrical Syndicate 62 case argument 
turned on whether the director had "authorised" the infringement within the 
meaning of the relevant Copyright Act. 
In the recent case of Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping 
Corporation and Arvind Mehra 63 the English Court of Appeal accepted that 
director liability may arise where the director has ordered or procured the 
acts of other persons which render the company liable. In that case the 
company had made representations in letters signed by the director and in 
documents presented by him which gave rise to liability in deceit . However, 
although the director knew the statements were false the court did not find 
57 (1978) 89 DLR (3d) 195. 
58 [1984] RPC 61 , 92. 
59 n 58. 
60 [1985] 2 All ER415 . 
61 n 4, 3. 
62 n 52 . 
63 [1995] 2 Lloyd ' s Rep 365 (QBD). 
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him personally liable after analysing the decision in Williams. There the 
House of Lords had based their judgment on the pre-eminence of the 
separate legal personality doctrine and consequently the Court of Appeal 
viewed the principles of tortious liability in accordance with this rule of 
company law. Thus, having attributed the tortious actions to the company, 
the personal liability of the director was disallowed. 
In BBC Worldwide Ltd and Another v. Pally Screen Printing Ltd 64 the 
defendant director was described as the "moving force" behind the company 
who was responsible for the relevant copyright and passing off actions. It was 
argued that the fact that the company was small and that the defendant was a 
sole director was a major factor in determining whether the director was 
personally liable. However, the court followed Spritebrand and said that no 
matter how small the company was and how powerful the control of the 
director over its affairs , it was nevertheless necessary to examine the actual 
part played by the director in the tortious activity. To hold otherwise would 
discourage commercial enterprise and lead to the unnecessary joinder of 
multiple parties in proceedings. It was argued that this may put unfair pressure 
on parties to settle and be used as a tactical move. 
Both the "directs" and the "make it their own" tests have been adopted in 
Australian case law.65 The majority of cases to use these tests are in the 
intellectual property arena. A recent case to adopt the "directs" approach 
was Root Quality Pty Ltd v Root Control Technologies Pty Ltd 66 . There 
Finkelstein J rejected the Sprite brand finding as to knowledge and held 
that intention was a necessary element of directing and procuring by the 
director where the tort was an actionable wrong to procure the violation of 
the legal rights of another in the tradition of Lumley v Gye.67 He added that 
constructive knowledge following from a reckless disregard of the facts 
would suffice. Finkelstein J commented on the assumption of 
64 [1995] FSR 665 . 
65 King v Milpurrurru ( 1996) 136 ALR 327; Australian Perfo rming Right Association Ltd v 
Valamo Pty Ltd ( 1990) 18 IPR 216. 
66 [2000] FCA 980 . 
67 (1853) 118 ER 749. 
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responsibility test, which will be discussed below, but went on to decide 
the case on the directs or procures test. He commented that it would be 
difficult to define what amounted to "making the tort one's own". In 
Mentmore this was thought by Le Dain J to be "obviously a question of 
fact to be decided on the circumstances of each case". In this case, the 
court found that the plaintiff needed to prove that the director intentionally 
procured the infringement of its patent. The director's belief that selling the 
product in question was not a patent infringement was enough to free him 
from liability as in this particular instance intention was required. The 
relevant line of cases began with Said v Butt where Mc Cardie J said: 
"Nothing that I have said to-day is, I hope, inconsistent with the rule that a director or 
a servant who actually takes part in or actually authorizes such torts as assault, 
trespass to property, nuisance, or the like may be liable in damages as a joint 
participant in one of such recognized heads oftortious wrong."68 
Hardie Boys J distinguished the situation in Ivory from the case where a 
director was said to have authorised, directed or procured a company tort and 
said in the latter situation the inquiry would be "quite different" . He did not 
outline in what way the test would be different but it is likely that the court 
would have followed the English cases. It is difficult to see why Ivory could 
not have been discussed in terms of directing and procuring the tort. 
B The assumption of responsibility principle 
Recent case law points to a preference amongst the judiciary for the 
assumption ofresponsibility test despite its "long and chequered history as 
an ingredient ofliability" .69 The foundational statement on that test can be 
found in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd. 70 Since that 
decision a variety of circumstances have given rise to an "assumption of 
responsibility" including a making quasi-contractual promise, making a 
68 Saidv Butt [1920] 3 KB 497,506. 
69 n 4, 111 . 
70 [1964] AC 465 . 
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choice to act or to take on a legal obligation and choosing a relationship of 
re! iance or dependence. 71 These are of no relevance to this question 
because Hedley Byrne was distinguished in Trevor Ivory Ltd v Anderson 72 , 
a case that laid down a new test for assumption of responsibility by 
directors, as being unconcerned with whether directors, shareholders or 
employees had assumed a personal duty.73 
The facts of the Ivory decision were that the respondents had contracted with a 
one-person company called Trevor Ivory Ltd for horticultural advice and 
supplies. Their aim was to secure the expertise of the company's principal, 
Trevor Ivory. Mr Ivory subsequently gave negligent advice as to the spraying 
of the respondent's raspberry orchard which was destroyed causing substantial 
losses to the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeal accepted that a director may come 
under a personal duty to a third party in the course of company business and 
that breach of that duty may lead to personal liability. The test was whether 
there had been an actual or imputed assumption of a duty of care. This would 
depend on a balancing of policy considerations and the degree of assumption 
of personal responsibility present. Cooke P observed that the owner of a one 
person company might also assume personal responsibility but "something 
special" was required to justify putting it into that class.74 According to the 
President, no attempt could be made to determine in advance what would 
amount to something special. He adopted the reasoning of the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal in Sea/and of the Pacific v Robert C McHaffie 
Ltd 75 where it was held that although the company may have contracted with 
the McHaffie Ltd for the expertise of Mr McHaffie, the contract was between 
McHaffie Ltd and the plaintiff and the director was a stranger to it. 
71 K Barker, Unreliable assumptions in the Modern Law of Negligence (1993) I 09 LQR 461 , 
464. 
72 n 5. 
73 n 5, 524. 
74 n 5,518. 
75 (1974) 51 DLR (3d)702. 
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"An employee's act or omission that constitutes his employer's breach of action may 
also impose a liability on the employee in tort . However, this will only be so if there 
is breach of a duty owed (independently of the contract) by the employee to the other 
party. Mr McHaffie did not owe the duty to Seal and to make inquiries . That was a 
company responsibility. It is the failure to carry out the corporate duty imposed by 
contract that can attract liability to the company. The duty in negligence and the duty 
in contract may stand side by side but the duty in contract is not imposed upon the 
employee as a duty in tort. 
" ... the test is, or at least includes, whether there has been an assumption of 
responsibility, actual or imputed. That is an appropriate test for the personal liability 
of both a director and an employee". 
In Ivory the fact that Mr Ivory had formed his company specifically to 
avoid liability was sufficient to show there had been no assumption of 
personal responsibility. There was nothing beyond "routine involvement" 
by Mr Ivory in this case. Lord Cooke of Thorn don later commented that "if 
the plaintiff had reasonably thought that it was dealing with an individual, 
the result might have been different". 76 This suggests that "something 
special" may involve factors that make it appear that the defendant was 
acting in his or her personal capacity. An example may be where the letter 
was not written on company notepaper. 77 In Tait v Austin78 employee share 
purchase schemes were established with no registered prospectus as 
required by the Securities Act 1978. After the company went into 
receivership and liquidation the former employees sued the company and 
the directors. Although liability was governed by securities legislation it 
was noted that there was nothing special on the facts of that case that 
would suggest the defendant assumed a personal responsibility to the 
shareholders. 
If Mr Ivory had conducted his business with no mention of the limited 
nature of the company and advertised the services as being his rather than 
76 Lord Cooke ofThorndon, 1997 Hamlyn Lecture "Turning Points of the Common Law ", 18, 
n 51. 
77 Livingstone v Bonifant ( 1995) 7 NZCLC 260,657. 
78 (2000) 8 NZCLC 262,167. 
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those of the company this may have amounted to an assumption of 
personal liability. Although Mr Ivory provided the advice personally and 
engaged in extensive dealings with the complainants, the court found this 
had been carried out on behalf of a limited liability company and he was 
thus shielded from liability. 
In Ivory it was said that in forming a one person company the director would 
be in the same position as if he had transferred his business to someone else 
and agreed to act on their behalf. Whether the principal is a company or a 
natural person, someone acting on his behalf may incur personal liability in 
tort and impose vicarious or attributed liability upon his principal. This aspect 
of the judgment is similar to that of Williams in that it clarifies that an agent 
may through his or her actions incur personal liability which is separate to that 
of the company. 
1 Assumption of responsibility in the United Kingdom 
An earlier assumption of responsibility case was Fairline Shipping 
Corporation v Adamson 79 where the court found the director owed the 
plaintiffs a duty of care despite the fact that the contract was between the 
plaintiffs and the company. The court cited cases where a duty had been found 
between employees or servants and the plaintiff, both where there had been a 
contract between the company and the plaintiff and in another case where 
there had been no contract. The court asserted that whether the defendant had 
stolen the plaintiffs goods or handled them negligently, if the employer was 
liable on the basis ofrespondeat superior, then the servant should also be 
personally liable and that this rule should be applied to all employees 
including directors. The finding of personal responsibility in Fairline was 
based on a letter from the director which was not on company notepaper and 
which the court analysed as showing that the director assumed a duty of care 
to the plaintiffs and regarded himself and not the company as responsible for 
the storage of the goods. 
79 [1974] 2 All ER 967. 
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Yet a director was held not to have assumed a responsibility in Williams v 
Natural Life Health Foods Ltd 80. There the director, Mistlin, had formed a 
company that was essentially a one-person operation to franchise a health 
food shop concept. He had been heavily involved in the preparation of 
materials which were given to prospective franchisees and these materials 
contained statements that were supported by Mistlin's knowledge and 
experience of the health food business. The plaintiffs relied upon these 
statements and opened such a shop but closed after 18 months of trading at a 
loss. The plaintiffs claimed against Mistlin personally and argued that the 
materials had included negligent misstatements as to the likely success of the 
health food franchises. In analysing the personal liability of the director for 
the financial losses caused by the negligent advice of his company, the Court 
of Appeal stated that the representations had been made "entirely qua Mr 
Misti in and not as qua director" .81 The court found that the director had 
assumed responsibility because the representations were based on the 
experience he gained running his own health food shop prior to the 
incorporation of Natural Life Foods Ltd. Waite LJ argued that the duty in tort 
rests primarily with the company and is only secondarily imputed to its agent. 
He said that the liability of the company was often the only one but that in 
some rare circumstances the representor may be fixed with personal liability 
for negligent misstatement. These circumstances would only arise in special 
cases to avoid "setting at naught" limited liability protection.82 
The suggestion by Waite LJ that a company is primarily liable for the torts of 
its agents while the agents are only secondarily liable through the company 
was challenged by the House of Lords . Lord Steyn recognised that once the 
individual's own acts are in issue, the status of the corporation as principal 
does not preclude the agent' s primary liability for his own acts : 
80 
11 46. 
81 [1997] 1 BCLC 131 perWaiteLJ. 
82 n 81 , 154. 
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"Whether the principal is a company or a natural person, someone acting on his 
behalf may incur personal liability in tort as well as imposing vicarious or attributed 
liability on his principal". 83 
In determining how this personal liability may be incurred, their Lordships 
applied the extended Hedley Byrne principle from Henderson v Merrett 
Syndicates Ltd. 84 Hedley Byrne established that a duty of care would arise 
where someone undertook to apply their special skill for the benefit of 
another person who relied upon that skill. 85 Henderson enlarged the 
possible situations where this principle would apply to include assumptions 
of responsibi I ity for the provision of services as well as for statements. 
Further, it allowed recovery in respect of economic loss. 
According to the Henderson test, where liability arises under a contract or 
in a situation "equivalent to contract" then an objective test applies as to 
whether responsibility should be held to have been assumed by the 
defendant. Thus, the state of mind of the defendant is not the focus but 
rather the things he or she has said or done.86 The court will not assess 
internal arrangements between the director and the company but may 
consider the relevant contextual scene. The inquiry will always be whether 
the director or someone on his behalf directly or indirectly conveyed an 
assumption of personal responsibility to the plaintiff. Although Hedley 
Byrne was distinguished in Ivory, the test flowing from it was applied in 
Williams which was a situation similar to that of Ivory. Thus, the New 
Zealand courts may be persuaded by this English test for assumption of 
responsibility which was decided after Ivory. 
In White v Jones 87 Lord Browne-Wilkinson analysed the meaning of 
assumption of responsibility as a conscious assumption ofresponsibility 
for the task, and not the assumption of legal liability. He stated that once 
83 n 46, 582. 
84 
[ 1994] 3 All ER 506 . 
85 n 46, 502-503 . 
86 n 46, 582 . 
87 
[ 1995] 2 AC 207. 
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the adviser accepted responsibility for the task, he or she created a special 
relationship in relation to which the law attached a duty to perform 
carefully. 
In Williams because there had been no personal dealings between the 
plaintiffs and the defendant director the House of Lords found there had been 
no assumption of responsibility by the director and thus the plaintiffs had to 
look to the defunct company for satisfaction of their claim. The contents of the 
brochure and the fact that Mistlin owned and controlled the company were 
insufficient for finding an assumption of personal liability. In answer to the 
Court of Appeal's finding that the knowledge the plaintiffs relied upon was 
represented as being that of Mistlin personally because it was gained prior to 
incorporating his company, Lord Steyn observed that if a food expert with 
many years experience incorporates a company it is not their intention in so 
doing to assume personal responsibility towards their customers. 
An important aspect of the test is that reliance on the assumption of 
personal responsibility by the defendant must be reasonable.88 For 
example, in Fashion Brokers Ltd v Clarke Hayes 89 where reasonable 
reliance was considered and Williams applied it was held unreasonable for 
a solicitor to rely on a brief telephone conversation with a local council 
planning department. 
The reliance test will involve asking not just whether the plaintiff has actually 
acted on the advice given and whether that outcome was reasonable but 
requires an analysis of the relationship of the parties. This analysis will 
include the defendant's possession of special skills, a conscious undertaking 
to use that skill on behalf of the plaintiff and knowledge by the defendant that 
the plaintiff will place reliance on that skill or undertaking.90 The difficulty in 
determining whether an undertaking has been made is when it is implied 
rather than express. If Mistlin had assumed personal responsibility to the 
plaintiffs it would have been unclear whether they had actually relied on him 
88 n 46, 584. 
89 [2000] Lloyd ' s Rep PN 398. 
90 n 70 . 
THE TORTIOUS LIABILITY OF THE ONE-PERSON COMPANY DIRECTOR 21 
personally. Neyer argues that the plaintiff actually sued the wrong defendant 
in this case and should have sued the employee they actually dealt with and 
relied upon in receiving the negligent misstatements. 91 
The difficulty encountered in many cases is distinguishing facts that point to a 
personal assumption of responsibility from facts that suggest only 
performance of the company's contractual obligations. Lord Steyn stated that 
the liability of the company depends on a special relationship with the 
respondents giving rise to an assumption of responsibility. As Misti in had 
been a stranger to that relationship he could not be a joint tortfeasor with the 
company. His Lordship stated that a finding of personal liability would require 
a special relationship between Mistlin and the plaintiffs and in this case there 
had been no such relationship. 92 
Borrowdale has analysed the decision in Williams as refining the assumption 
of responsibility test by drawing a distinction between assumption of 
responsibility by a company for the performance of a contract and situations 
where a director assumes personal responsibility for liability flowing from 
tortious conduct.93 In the former case a company assumes liability for 
performance and for deficient performance and thus its agent cannot be liable. 
Thus, in the case of a contract by the company, only the company can be 
liable unless the director independently guarantees his or her performance. 
2 Useful arguments from Canadian jurisprudence 
In London Drugs Ltd v Kuehne & Nagel Int Ltd 94 La Forest J considered 
that where a tortious act has been carried out in a contractual setting, that 
setting should be considered in any determination of possible liability. In 
that case, two forklift operators had carelessly dropped and damaged a 
valuable transformer but a contract limited the liability of their corporate 
employer to $40. The Supreme Court of Canada considered the issue of 
91 n 28, 233. 
92 n 46, 585. 
93 A Borrowdale, Directors' Liability in Tort [ 1999) NZLJ 51, 52. 
94 n 47. 
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whether the individual employees could be held personally liable in 
negligence. La Forest J dissented on the duty of care issue and argued that 
when someone contracts with a company they do so on the basis that the 
company and not its employees will be liable for negligence. 
A further persuasive argument by La Forest J was that, unlike their 
employer, the employees were not in a position to limit their liability 
through contract. He argued that vicarious liability should be maintained 
because it ensures that the party most able to pay and most able to remedy 
negligence is saddled with the responsibility for compensation. A further 
point identified by the judge was the different treatment often afforded to 
physical damage and economic loss cases. Although these could be 
approached in the same way by the judiciary, it was clear that precedent 
favoured plaintiffs who had suffered physical damage. 
The majority nevertheless found that an employee is not relieved of 
liability in negligence for his or her own acts merely because of an agency 
relationship with an employer. This liability may extend to economic loss 
in certain undefined circumstances. 95 The Ontario Court of Appeal applied 
London Drugs to this effect in Alper Development Inc v Harrowston 
Corp96 and refused to strike out claims against an employee of the 
defendant company who had contracted with the plaintiff for the provision 
of insurance services. The pleading was simply that the individual 
defendant had been careless. Because the proximity standard of neg I igence 
articulated in London Drugs was too vague the Court refused to strike out 
the pleadings and allowed the claims to go to trial. 
In Edgeworth Construction Ltd v ND Lea & Associates Ltd 97 the province 
of British Columbia hired a firm of engineers to prepare specifications for 
a project being put out to tender. Both the firm and the individual engineers 
who had affixed their seals to the plans were later sued by the chosen 
contractor who claimed it had suffered economic loss because the project 
95 n 28. 
96 1998 ACWSJ LEXIS 45823 (March 23, 1998). 
97 [1993) 3 SCR206. 
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has been more costly to complete than the specifications suggested. The 
Supreme Court was unanimous in deciding that the engineers were not 
personally liable in negligent misstatement for economic loss caused to the 
construction firm which had relied on their carelessly prepared 
construction plans. This was because although the plaintiff may have relied 
on the defendant company, they had not relied on the individual employee. 
La Forest J considered that it would be unrealistic to use the fact that the 
engineers had affixed their seals to the relevant plans as a basis for a 
finding of assumption of responsibility or reliance. The judge considered 
that reasonableness of reliance should be based on wider contextual 
factors: 
"Reliance on the individual employee will rarely if ever be reasonable. In most if 
not all situations, reliance on an employee will not be reasonable in the absence 
of an express or implied undertaking of responsibility by the employee to the 
plaintiff. Mere performance of the contract [between the plaintiff and the 
company] by the employee, without more, is not evidence of such an 
undertaking. "98 
In London Drugs and Edgeworth La Forest J argued that there is a 
distinction between reliance on the special skill held out by the person 
performing the task and reliance on the particular defendant's 
"pocketbook" as a fund of compensation if negligence eventuates. In 
London Drugs Iacobucci J criticised this approach arguing that the duty of 
care analysis should focus on "the relationship between the plaintiff's 
position and the tortfeasor ' s conduct, not with the relationship between the 
plaintiff's position and the tortfeasor ' s pocketbook." 
The different outcomes in the Edgeworth and London Drugs cases may appear 
to reflect a greater willingness to find liability in cases of physical damage 
caused through a careless act rather than economic loss caused through 
careless advice. However, in NBD Bank v Dofasco Inc99 a Chief Financial 
Officer and a shareholder were held liable for US$1.9 million after being 
98 n 97, 313 . 
99 [2000] I BLR (3d) I . 
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found liable for negligent misstatements as to the financial stability of their 
company. 
3 The treatment of assumption of responsibility in New Zealand 
One successful tort claim which was has been analysed as an assumption of 
responsibility case was Centrepac Partnership & Ors v Foreign Currency 
Consultants Limited & Ors. ' 00 There a director of an effectively one person 
company had contracted on its behalf with the plaintiff's company to provide 
foreign currency advice and to act as their agent in foreign currency 
transactions. The director had gone on to commit the plaintiffs to foreign 
exchange contracts even though they had insisted he stay out of the market. 
The plaintiffs argued that the director was the sole controlling force behind the 
company and argued that he had procured and directed the acts. The High 
Court said that the director owed a duty of care in dealing with the plaintiff's 
foreign exchange transactions and said that it was difficult to envisage a 
relationship outside contract reflecting closer proximity than that between the 
plaintiffs and the director in this case. In emphasising that a duty of care 
would not be found between a company director and the company's clients in 
all cases, the court stated that it would depend on the facts of each case and 
that there must be a sufficient degree of proximity and foreseeable harm. In 
finding the duty the Court said they did not need to lift the corporate veil 
because the duty existed directly between the director and the plaintiffs. 
The assumption of responsibility analysis is problematic here because, 
although foreseeability and proximity were made out, the only clear 
assumption by the director was made through contract and the contract was in 
fact with his company. This does not exclude tortious liability on the part of 
the director but in this contractual context the director's acts should be 
analysed as acts of the company's agent in carrying out, and breaching, the 
contract. As principal, the company should have been primarily liable here 
and yet the director was found liable in negligence on his own account. 
100 
( 1989) 4 NZCLC 64, 940. 
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In Jagwar Holdings Ltd v Julian' 0 ' the High Court distinguished Ivory 
because two directors, who were found personally liable for deceit, had not 
made a declaration that incorporation was intended to shield them from 
liability as Mr Ivory had. Further, there was no contract in this case as there 
had been in Ivory. Thorp J held that it was fair that directors who took 
responsibility for giving company information to third parties who were being 
induced to take a substantial interest in that company, to personally take 
responsibility for their representation. 102 The different outcomes in Jagwar 
and Ivory may have been due to the fact that in selling the "business 
opportunity" the directors added their own personal endorsement to the 
information. The different outcomes may also have been due to the fact that 
deceit was involved and the courts have been more willing to find personal 
liability for intentional torts. 
Determining that the directors of a company were joint tortfeasors with it in 
Brooks v New Zealand Guardian Trust Co Ltd the Court of Appeal stated that 
where directors commit a tort while acting on behalf of their company and 
within the scope of their authority from the company, the company will be 
liable as a joint tortfeasor as is the case in other cases of principal and 
agent. 103 The director's acts are the acts of the company itself and the personal 
liabilities of the directors will result in joint liability on the part of the 
company. 
The Court distinguished their decision in Ivory because the relevant document 
had stipulated the personal responsibility of the directors. This arrangement 
where the directors have agreed to a manifest stipulation of their liability 
would seem to amount to an assumption of responsibility and "something 
special" as it was described in Ivory. However, in that case the issue was 
whether liability could also be attributed to the company as a joint tortfeasor 
101 
( 1992) 6 NZCLC 68,040. 
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so it was not determinative but the Court did accept that there was an arguable 
case that the directors were under a duty of care and said it should be assumed 
that they were. 
The High Court followed Ivory in Plypac Industries Limited v Marsh 104 
where the machine a company, Marshtech, had contracted to make for 
another company did not meet that client's specifications and was finally 
determined to be of no value. Once the plaintiff realised the company was 
unable to pay the judgment against it and was in liquidation, it sought 
judgment against the director personally and the insurer. The director' s 
application to strike out proceedings brought against him was successful 
because a "special circumstance" as per Ivory was not present on the facts 
of this case. It was held that the company and not the director was 
responsible for any act or omission by the director which related to 
obtaining the insurance cover that was at issue. The court stated that the 
director only owed a duty to his company, not to the client. Consequently, 
there was insufficient proximity either by reason of the relationship 
between the parties or by the assumption of responsibility by the director 
towards the client to give rise to a duty of care. 
Further, it was contrary to considerations of policy to find the director liable 
because to do so would be equivalent to placing the director in the shoes of an 
insurer for parties dealing with the company. It would also be contrary to the 
freedom of contract to enforce an obligation on a non-contracting party which 
the contracting parties did not provide for in the contract. It was argued that it 
is more necessary for tort liability to be upheld against a director when there is 
no contractual recourse against that party. 
In considering the issue of whether the director owed a duty of care to the 
client, Master Venning quoted the South Pacific Manufacturing105 case which 
favoured the Anns test of proximity. In South Pacific Richardson J stated that 
proximity included the question of foreseeability, the degree of analogy with 
104 (1998) 8 NZCLC pass 261 , 
105 [1992] 2 NZLR 282 . 
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previous cases in which duties are established and an assessment of the 
competing moral claims. Policy considerations were, of course, the second 
step of this test. In this case, the issue of proximity included reasonable 
foreseeability of harm if care is not taken and also whether or not there has 
been an assumption of responsibility by the director to the plaintiff. 
This wider enquiry as to whether there was a duty of care was preferred in 
Banfield v Johnson 106 where it was stated that Ivory should not be regarded as 
authority for the proposition that it will only be in cases of an assumption of 
responsibility that a director will be found personally liable for a tort. 
A director successfully argued that the principle of assumption of 
responsibility should apply to liability for breach of contract as well as to tort 
liability in Mahon v Crockett. 107 Crockett claimed that Mahon, the director 
and controller of several companies, had agreed to pay him a percentage of 
the company's profits and was personally liable for those payments. The 
Court of Appeal held that an act by an agent of the company would not in 
itself give rise to personal responsibility and that an actual assumption of 
liability, in this case through a contract, must be proved. This was so despite 
the fact that the director actually told the respondent he would pay him 10% 
of what he made because the parties knew the director did not stand to make 
anything personally from the arrangement. 
The court applied the decision in Edgeworth, which required an express or 
implied undertaking of responsibility by an employee, and stated that an 
actual assumption of liability must be proved against the director. In the 
case of contract to establish personal liability it must be shown that there 
was a contract unequivocally involving the company officer or agent who 
accepted personal liability apart from any liability which might apply to the 
corporation. 
106 Banfield v Johnson (1994) 7 NZCLC 260,496. 
107 (1999) 8 NZCLC 262,043. 
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In Shing v Ashcroft 108 the Court of Appeal described a claim against a 
company director as an attempt to circumvent the principles of limited 
liability of incorporated companies. They stated that it was possible that a 
director may make an implied representation that he was warranting his 
company's ability to perform a contract but said that there was insufficient 
authority in which to make a decision. The court found for the director. 
C The test of control 
Factors such as proximity and control may indicate an assumption of 
liability. 109 In Ivory Hardie Boys J observed that an assumption of 
responsibility may be imputed where a director or employee exercises control 
over a particular operation or activity. Thus, sufficient control may have been 
present if Mr Ivory had sprayed the raspberry plants himself. 
In Morton v Douglas Homes Ltd 11 0 Hardie Boys J found that directors who 
knew they were building flats on unsound land demonstrated the requisite 
degree of control because they were responsible for implementing an 
engineer's cautionary report and did not. The work was supervised firstly by 
an employee of the company and then by one of the company directors who 
was not a qualified builder. Hardie Boys J found that director liable for the 
subsidence which resulted from his ignoring the engineer' s report. The other 
director was liable because he had taken charge of the development, knew of 
the problems with it, sought an engineer' s advice but then did not ensure the 
engineer did what the company was relying on him to do. Having taken 
control of the building operation he either knew or should have known about 
these facts . 
In Morton the court said that a director would only be personally liable for a 
company tort where they had expressly directed it and would only be liable to 
the company's client if they owed a duty of care and did not observe it. This 
liability arises not from the director's position but from the proximity or 
108 
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neighbourhood between the director and plaintiff. There was no need for them 
to actually oversee the work in this case so long as a careless exercise of their 
control caused damage to a third party. This contrasts with the need for Mr 
Ivory to not only oversee the work but actually do it. However, the directors in 
Morton had supervised some of the building work themselves which 
demonstrates a greater involvement than that of Mr Ivory. 
There are problems with the test of control in the one person company 
context. While a director who does not personally control operations may not 
intend to assume personal responsibility, it does not follow that a director who 
does assume total control does intend to assume personal responsibility. 111 If 
Mr Ivory had personally sprayed the plants and was consequently held liable, 
this would seem to impose greater liability for a negligent action than a 
negligent misstatement. The test of control may be useful in analysing the part 
of the tortious act that can be ascribed to the director and whether he or she 
assumed responsibility but it is insufficient to determine whether the director 
is personally liable' 12 . Hardie Boys J recognised this limitation in Ivory by 
stating that the control test was more likely to arise within a large company 
where there are clear allocations of responsibility than in a small one. 
In Callaghan v Robert Ronayne Ltd 113 Speight J stressed that the director 
must be the actual tortfeasor and must have committed a tortious act rather 
than merely allowing it to arise by default. In that case the directors had not 
exercised any personal control or instruction. In Callaghan the court stated 
that the relevance of the degree of control was that it provided a test of 
whether a director's personal carelessness was likely to cause damage to a 
third party. It was this likelihood that may give rise to a duty of care, not the 
fact of directorship itself. 
The different outcomes in the cases may be due to the fact that in Morton 
there was something, unsound land and an engineer's report, which should 
111 A Borrowdale, liability of Directors in Tort - Developments in New Zealand [ 1998] JBL 
96, 104. 
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have put the directors on guard whereas Callaghan was a case of simple 
defective workmanship. 
Counsel for the directors argued that this argument imposed liability on the 
directors by virtue of their office in a way that would not have been done 
had the directors been employees and that this made them vicariously 
liable for the negligence of their company. Hardie Boys J disagreed and 
pointed out that the level of control exercised by different directors may 
vary significantly. 114 
V THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTRACT TO THE ANALYSIS 
Grantham & Rickett describe the developing assumption of responsibility tort 
as a voluntary, contract-like undertaking rather than an imposed duty of 
care. 115 They argue that Lord Steyn in Williams treated the assumption 
principle as synonymous with the duty outlined in Hedley Byrne which states 
that where "there is an assumption of responsibility in circumstances in which, 
but for the absence of consideration, there would be a contract." 11 6 
The assumption of responsibility principle has been criticised as resting on a 
fiction which is used to justify a conclusion that a duty of care exists. 117 In 
Williams this was seen as "overstated" by Lord Steyn. He argued that because 
contract law is limited by consideration and privity of contract, this quasi-
contractual duty was necessary to "fill a gap" in the law. In Smith v Eric S 
Bush 11 8 Lord Griffith stated that the assumption of responsibility test was not 
helpful or realistic because it would rarely be undertaken expressly and it was 
not clear exactly what amounts to an assumption of responsibility. 
The contractual analysis postulates that if tort liability arises within a 
contractual matrix then it must be assessed according to that and the parties 
planned obligations must be given pre-eminence. This involves assessing 
114 n 110,595. 
115 R Grantham & C Rickett, Directors ' 'Tortious ' Liability: Contract, Tort or Company 
law?, (1999) 62 MLR 133 . 
11 6 n 70, 528-529. 
11 7 n 46, 584. 
11 8 [1990] 1 AC831. 
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what the parties actually contracted for. The assumption of responsibility 
test in Trevor Ivory and Williams is used to demonstrate that the director 
did not assume financial responsibility for the negligent breach of his legal 
duty. The only way that the director could have assumed such 
responsibility was through contract. 
In Ivory the Court of Appeal is suggesting that the raspberry growers 
contracted to look solely to the company for indemnification occasioned by 
a breach of the duty of care. 119 David Goddard has pointed out that in Ivory 
the plaintiffs were trying to use tort to improve their contcactual bargain 
and that there is no legal or economic justification for this. The limited 
recourse term is like an exclusion clause and the courts have held that 
claims based on concurrent liability cannot be used to get around such 
clauses. 120 Similarly, in London Drugs, Justice La Forest argued that where 
a plaintiff choses to deal with the company they should be aware that only 
the company may be liable because legislation provides for proper notice 
to be made of the fact of incorporation. 
Where those planned obligations negate tort liability, contract "trumps" 
tort. 121 For example, in Wolfe v. Moir a director, Moir, advertised his 
company's roller skating rink as Moir's Sports Land, did not include 'Ltd' 
on any documentation and encouraged the public's identification of 
himself with the company. The Alberta Court of Appeal found in favour of 
a plaintiff who suffered a physical injury at the rink on the basis that 
corporate formalities had failed to be compiled with. Analysing this in 
terms of contract law, it can be argued that what the parties intended was a 
contract between the plaintiff and Mr Moir personally. The court found 
that as Mr Moir made no effort to advertise the limited nature of the 
business he had made a representation of unlimited liability. Thus, through 
the application of tort principles both the plaintiffs and the defendants are 
11 9 n 28, 233. 
120 n 35, 62 . 
121 n 28. 
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held to their original bargain. It is possible for concurrent liabilities to exist 
in contract and tort. 122 
VI INTENTIONAL AND NON-INTENTIONAL TORTS 
There is no liability in tort unless the plaintiff proves fault on the part of the 
defendant either through intent or negligence. The case law has dealt 
differently with intentional as opposed to negligent or innocent breaches of 
duties. For example, in Ivory Cooke P observed that in the case of a non-
intentional tort it would be wrong to find a director jointly liable with the 
company even if proximity and foreseeability were found. This contrasts with 
his later comment that: 
" Where damage to property or other economic loss is the basis of a claim, it may 
well be possible to sheet home personal responsibility for an intentional tort, such as 
deceit or knowing conversion . And of course if the individual defendant has placed 
himself in a fiduciary position towards the plaintiff, he will be personally liable for 
breach of his fiduciary duty." 123 
Cooke P further considered this issue in Watson v Do/mark Industries 
Ltd 124 . There the Court of Appeal found a director personally liable for 
procuring his company's deceit and for being involved in his company 's 
breach of fiduciary duty. The director had made an agreement with an 
Australian company to make their product in New Zealand and pay them a 
$2 royalty for each unit produced. The director did not disclose the full 
number of sales made and issued false invoices. He then used the profits 
from these undisclosed transactions to manufacture a new product. Cooke 
P said that a case of personal dishonesty where the director knowingly 
assisted in the wrong differed from the Ivory situation where the owner of a 
one man company owed a duty of care. 
122 Rowe v Turner Hopkins & Partners [ 1982] 1 NZLR 178, 181 . 
123 n 5, 524. 
124 [1992] 3 NZLR 311. 
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Thus, it may be possible to argue that where a director has knowingly carried 
out an intentional tort causing economic loss, then this should be sufficient to 
establish personal liability whether or not there is an assumption of 
responsibility. 
A director was found personally liable for inducing a breach of contract by 
his company in Cook Strait Skyferry Ltd v Dennis Thompson International 
Ltd 125 . There the High Court followed the Said v Butt line of cases which 
upheld the principle that where a director or servant takes part in or 
authorises such torts as assault, trespass to property, nuisance that director 
may be liable in damages as a joint participant. 126 The claim against the 
director was not struck out because the court held that a director could be 
liable for procuring a breach of contract by the company if acting outside 
the scope of his authority and not acting bona fide and that would depend 
on the actual facts of the case. 
In Mehra 127 the Court of Appeal said that Lord Steyn 's assumption of 
responsibility principles in Williams were applicable to other torts besides 
negligence, including deceit. In that case Mr Mehra had not led the plaintiff 
to believe he was assuming personal responsibility for the misrepresentations 
and the plaintiff believed they were dealing with the director ' s company. 
Thus, Mr Mehra was not held liable. 
3 Incorporation of professional practices 
In the light of the Ivory decision it can be seen that the personal liability of a 
professional person who incorporates their partnership will depend on the 
extent to which that person has assumed responsibility towards the plaintiff. 
The fact of assumption of responsibility will be unaffected by the presence or 
absence of incorporation and the fact that as a result of it the plaintiff will 
contract with the company and not with the individual. However, as stated by 
La Forest J above any tortious analysis will need to be considered within its 
125 [1993] 2 NZLR 72. 
126 n 68, 506. 
121 n 63 . 
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contractual setting. The decision in Mahon v Crockett would suggest that there 
must be assumption ofresponsibility with regard to a particular transaction 
but given Lord Devlin's comments in Hedley Byrne that responsibility may be 
undertaken either as part of a general relationship, such as between solicitor 
and client, or specifically in relation to a particular transaction, 128 it may be 
possible to argue that the duty is wider than this. 
Cooke P's insistence that something special is required in the one person 
company context may suggest that something more than merely a, for 
example, solicitor/client relationship is required. A partner may need to take a 
prominent role in the business in the manner of the Moir case cited above or 
specifically authorise or instruct the carrying out of the tortious act. It should 
be borne in mind that Banfield v Johnson suggests that, at least in the case of 
negligence, the court may apply a test other than assumption ofresponsibility 
and in some circumstances the directs or procures test may be considered 
appropriate. 
Tort law is concerned to ensure the quality of professional services and to 
allow the professions to avoid liability through incorporation may be 
considered undesirable. 129 In White v Jones 130 where a solicitor had failed to 
draw up a will in accordance with a client ' s instructions it was noted that the 
professional at fault could not be censured in disciplinary proceedings. In that 
case it was shown that the solicitor had assumed responsibility to his client 
and not a third party beneficiary of a will. In dissenting to the majority ' s 
decision to extend liability to include such beneficiaries, Lord Mustill said that 
a solicitor' s knowledge that the intended beneficiary' s economic well-being 
depended upon his careful execution of his task was quite different to the 
solicitor undertaking the task for the beneficiaries. 131 
128 n 46, 528-529. 
129 B Hepp le, Negligence, The Search for Coherence ( 1997) 50 Current Legal Problems 
67, 87. 
130 [1995] 2 AC 207 . 
13 1 n 130, 279. 
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VII EMPLOYEE INDEMNITY 
The fact of insurance is relevant to a determination of who should bear the 
loss in a particular case. 132 Such information arguably allows a court to place 
the costs of an accident on the person best able to distribute the loss and best 
able to avoid the accident. The Companies Act 1955 contained a broad 
prohibition against companies indemnifying directors against a breach of duty 
in relation to the company itself. This was because a director may be less 
conscientious if no liability could attach for a breach of duty. 133 Section 
162(1) of the Companies Act 1993 restates that prohibition and extends it in 
two respects. An employee cannot be indemnified for any act or omission 
carried out in the course of their employment or for costs incurred in 
defending a claim. This prohibition is limited in section 162(5) which does 
allow indemnification in certain circumstances. However, the usefulness of 
this is limited in the one person company context where there will be a limit to 
how much insurance a director can afford. 
VIII POLICY ARGUMENTS CONCERNING DIRECTOR LIABILITY 
lt may be argued that, unlike unsecured creditors, victims of torts are non-
consensual claimants and thus it is unjust to insist they look only to the 
corporate entity for recourse. 134 It could also be argued that limited liability 
protects shareholders from the vicarious liability that tort would otherwise 
impose on them for the acts of their agents or employees. However, if it is 
remembered that the company is, in fact, only a fund and that this fund 
belongs to the shareholders then those members do not so easily escape 
liability, at least while the company is solvent. Furthermore, an agent of the 
corporation is not, by virtue of that fact, an agent of the director and thus there 
is no promise by the director to indemnify the tortfeasor agent. 13 5 
132 n 129 81. 
133 Beck and Borrowdale, Guidebook to New Zealand Companies and Securities Lmv (CCH, 
Auckland, 1998) 75. 
134 n 28, 196. 
135 n 28, 208. 
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Directors may seem an ideal target where a company has been wound up or 
there is a statute barring litigation against the company. 136 However, against 
holding directors liable it can be argued that although the separate corporate 
personality principle is a fiction which arguably does not sit well with one-
person companies, the risk of starting up a new company is great enough 
without adding liability which is more appropriately apportioned to the 
company. A director may take on greater potential liability than would be the 
case in everyday life. For example, Mr Ivory had the potential to (and did) 
cause thousands of dollars worth of damage which would not have been 
possible if he had confined himself to his own garden. Such an enterprise 
would be too expensive to contemplate for the ordinary small operator without 
the protection of incorporation. 
Further, a director who could be joined as a defendant may be more likely to 
settle rather than litigate because a court may order the one person to pay 
twice, once as the company and again as the director. It should be noted that 
the law accepts that incorporation may legitimately be used by a parent 
company to isolate tort liability in an operating subsidiary. 137 Similarly, the 
one-person company director should be able to limit liability to the company 
rather than "pay twice". 
A rash of actions against directors may make the office less desirable and 
make director's insurance less available as has happened in the US. 138 The 
importance of directors' insurance cover was recognised in the UK by the 
Likierman report which recommended that it should be facilitated by 
legislation. If insurance is expensive it is unlikely that it will be an option for 
a one-person company director. Further, legislation throughout the 
Commonwealth provides that directors have no personal liability except in 
those cases expressly provided by the statute. To impose tortious liability 
runs counter to this pattern. 
136 GHL Fridman, Personal Tort Liability of Company Directors (1992) 5 Canta L Rev 
41, 57. 
137 n 93, 102. 
138 I Lupson, The Potential Personal Liability of a Company's Directors and Officers Int 
Bank L 1990 8( 12), 200-202. 
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IX CONCLUSION 
A number of tests for director liability have been identified, each one with its 
own particular problems for the one person company. The "direct or procure" 
test may make one person company directors liable in too many situations and 
does not fully distinguish between a corporate tort and a personal one. Similar 
criticisms can be made of the "control" and "makes the act his or her own" 
tests. The assumption of responsibility test is preferable in the one person 
company context because it allows the director to consciously undertake 
responsibility. It is submitted that this is necessary to avoid "setting at naught" 
the protection of incorporation in the one person company situation. There are 
a number of tests for assumption of responsibility and so it is possible that its 
adoption could engender some confusion but decisions such as Mahon v 
Crockett have been very specific as to requirements placed upon directors in 
this situation by the courts. It can be concluded that where a company 
commits a tort it will generally be considered the tort of the company and not 
the director unless the director takes personal responsibility for the act and 
that this is identified through one of these tests. In addition, if a mental 
element is required by the tort then this must be established. 
The difficulty in this issue is that it forces a balancing act to be undertaken 
between tort law and company law. If the corporate veil is maintained despite 
a finding of a duty of care between the director and a third party too little 
weight is given to tort principles. Although the separate corporate personality 
doctrine is important, so too is the principle of holding a tortfeasor 
accountable for their wrong. However, as has been shown the separate 
corporate personality doctrine will usually prevail. 
LAW LIBRARY 
A Fine According to Library 
Regulations is charged on 
Overdue Books. 
VICTORIA 
UNIVERSITY 
OF 
WELLINGTON 
LIBRARY 
I111 1111~11~111111 ~If 1i1J1f 1111 1~~ l~l  ~~11i~~~III I~ l1~i1]~~1 
3 7212 00569512 5 
e 
AS741 
vuw 
A66 
T475 
2000 

